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Summary findings
Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack investigate the relationship  capacity utilization (possibly the byproduct of poor
between weak growth performance and low investment  policies) and constraints on absorptive capacity for skill
rates in Africa. The cross-country evidence suggests no  acquisition seem to be critical factors. If Tanzania is not
direct relationship. The positive and significant  atypical, the low productivity of investment in Africa was
coefficient on private investment appears to be driven by  the result of a combination of factors that occurred
Botswana's presence in the sample. Allowing for the  simultaneously, not any single factor.
endogeneity of private investment, controlling for policy,  What does this tell us? First, we should be more
and positing a nonlinear relationship make no difference  careful about calling for an investment boom so that
to the conclusion.  Africa can resume growth. Unless some or all of the
Higher investment in Africa would not by itself  underlying problems are addressed, the results may be
produce faster GDP growth. Africa's low investment and  disappointing. We should also be more circumspect
growth rates seem to be symptoms of underlying factors.  about Africa's low savings rate; it may be low because
To investigate those factors and to correct for some of  returns to investment were so low. The relatively high
the problems with cross-country analysis, Devarajan,  level of capital flight from Africa may have been a
Easterly, and Pack undertook a case study of  rational response to the lack of investment opportunities
manufacturing investment in Tanzania. They tried to  at home.
identify why output per worker declined while capital  Second, there is probably no single key to unlocking
per worker  increased. Some of the usual suspects-such  investment and GDP growth in Africa. All of the factors
as shifts from high- to low-productivity subsectors, the  contributing to low productivity should be addressed
presence of state-owned enterprises, or poor policies-  simultaneously.
did not play a significant role in this decline. Instead, low
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Abstract:  Many analysts decry the lack of sufficient investment in Africa, implying that
investment in Africa is "too low. " We  find no evidence that private and public capital are
productive in Africa, either in the cross-country  data or in micro data from Tanzania. In
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Anyone concerned about Sub-Saharan Africa's dismal growth perfornance over
the past three decades cannot help noticing that investment, too, was significantly lower
in Africa during this period. From 1960-94,  Africa invested 9.6 percent of GDP
(measured  at international prices), while the ratio for other developing countries was 15.6
percent (Hoeffler [19991). Inasmuch as Levine and Renelt [1992] identified investment
as one of the few robust variables in cross-country growth regressions, it is tempting to
conclude that Africa's low investment share contributed to its disappointing growth
performance-that  is, investment in Africa was "too low" (Barro and Lee [1993], Collier
and Gunning [1997]).
There are of course several difficulties with this conclusion, as some of these
authors have pointed out. First, since private investment  at least is endogenous, it is not
clear how to increase it in order to stimulate growth. Consequently, several researchers
have looked for more fundamental (and presumably more exogenous) factors in
explaining Africa's growth. The current list of candidates  includes proximity to the
tropics, ethnic fractionalization  and weak social capital (Sachs and Warner [1997],
Easterly and Levine [1997], Collier and Gunning [1997]). In an interesting recent paper,
Hoeffler [199] shows that, when the endogeneity of investment and unobserved country-
specific effects are allowed for, the so-called "Africa dummy"-the  unexplained
component of African growth-disappears.
Second, while Africa's total investment rate was below that of other developing
countries, public investment rates were about the same in the two sets of countries (about
7 percent of GDP). Any statement about whether African investment is too high or too
2low would therefore have to say something about the composition of that investment-
and whether more public investment would have benefited the continent.
Third, the cross-country regressions on which most of the analysis on growth and
investment is based assume that total factor productivity  (TFP) growth is uniform across
all countries (Pack [1994]). Yet it is differences in TFP growth that indicate whether
investment has been too high or too low in one country or another. Furthermore, in some
African countries, TFP growth has been negative, which is difficult to reconcile with
regression models that assume it is the same for all countries.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate  the productivity of investment in
Africa-to  answer the question posed in the title-using  a variety of methods. In section
II, we use cross-country regressions to explore whether public and private investment had
a positive and significant effect on growth in Africa. Recognizing that private investment
is endogenous, we use the method of instrumental variables (with the level of private
investment at the beginning of the period as the instrument). Our basic conclusion is that
public investment is not correlated with growth in Africa. Private investment is also not
correlated with growth, unless Botswana is included in the sample. A simple scatter plot
of the data shows why: Botswana is the only country in Africa to have high private
investment rates and high growth.
As we noted earlier, however, these cross-country regressions assume that TFP
growth is uniform across all countries. Although difficult to swallow in general, this
assumption  may be more appropriate in examining manufacturing investment only. For
the TFP associated with manufacturing  stems from internationally-available  blueprints
and technology, which are the same for all countries.  Hence in section III, we focus on
3the productivity  of manufacturing  investment,  and use a case study of Tanzania to
explore the different ways investment  was or was not productive. We show how a
combination  of factors, including public policies, insulation from market forces, weak
technological  capacity all combined to render manufacturing  capital in Tanzania
unproductive. If Tanzania is representative of other African countries, this analysis could
explain what is behind the cross-country  regressions reported in section II.
Our paper is by no means the first to examine the productivity of investment in
Africa--nor  will it be the last. Evidence  from a global sample indicates that private
investment is consistently associated with long-run growth (Levine and Renelt [1992],
DeLong and Summers [1991]). Just how important investment is in the growth process is
less clear. Young [1995] famously found that capital accumulation  played a huge role in
the East Asian growth miracles, with a minor role for TFP growth. Nelson and Pack
[1999]  dispute these findings, showing that the roles of TFP growth and capital
accumulation  cannot be disentangled  in a general production function without specifying
the form of technical progress. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [1997] also dispute
Young's finding by showing that the cross-country variation in TFP growth rates
accounts for 92 percent of the cross-country variation in per capita growth. Easterly and
Levine 2000 similarly find that many stylized facts about growth imply that most growth
and income differences are explained  by the "TFP residual" not by factor accumulation.
The impact of public investment is even less clear-cut. Easterly and Rebelo
[1994] find a positive relationship  between public infrastructure investment and growth
(although not an effect of total public investment  on growth), whereas Devarajan et al.
4[1997]  show that the share of public spending devoted to capital expenditure has a
negative association with long-run growth.
Several authors have asked whether a similar pattern emerges when the sample is
restricted to African countries. Khan and Kumar [1997] find that private investment is
more productive than public investment, both in the global sample as well as when
restricted to African countries (i.e., when they use regional slope dummies). Calamitsis
et al. [1999] also find that private investment is significant in an African growth
regression, while public investment is not robustly significant. These results confirm
earlier results by Khan and Rheinhart [1990]. By contrast, Hadjimichael et al. [1995]
show that public investment has a higher coefficient in a cross-country growth regression
of African countries. Furthermore, they find that the coefficient on private investment is
not statistically significant when macroeconomic  policy variables are included in the
regression. They interpret this result as implying that the only way investment affects
growth in Africa is directly through capital accumulation,  and not through increased
productivity growth. Similarly,  in a case study of Kenya, Oshikoya [1992] shows that the
only period in which investment  had a significant impact on growth was 1980-89,  which
was the period of financial liberalization. It is interesting to note that almost all of the
African samples contain Botswana, and none of them reports the results of excluding
Botswana from the sample.
Another set of papers look at the determinants of investment in Africa. Most of
these, too, emphasize the role of macroeconomic  policies in driving African investment.
Oshikoya [1992], [1994] points out that credit availability and low inflation are the major
determinants of investment in Africa. Elbadawi et al. [1998] examine the role of
5instability in lowering Africa's investment  rate. In a study of the SADC countries,
Mlambo and Elhiraika [1997] show that, while favorable macroeconomic  policies have a
positive effect on private investment,  public investment does not--implying that there
may be some crowding-out  in these countries.
II. Cross-country  analysis of returns to public and private investment in Africa
This section examines the cross-country  evidence on the returns to public and
private investment in Africa. 2 It does this by first examining simple correlations  between
public investment and growth, and private investment  and growth in Africa. Then a full
regression of growth 1970-97  on the averages of public and private investment  to GDP,
initial income, and population growth will be performed. Next, some individual
countries will be analyzed,  by way of illustration. Finally, the response of investment to
aid will be analyzed country by country, as indirect evidence as to whether aid meant
higher investment  - which it should h.ave  if economies were liquidity-constrained  and
returns to investment were reasonable.
A. Cross-section  results on growth and investment
First, a word about the data. Total investment is easily obtainable from the
national accounts. However, the split between public and private investment is more
problematic. If we define public investment as the sum of investment by general
government and by state enterprises, then we lack a standardized  international database
for such data. The Government  Finance Statistics of the IMF has data only on general
government (and even then often omitting local governments), and not on state
enterprises. We will return to the GFS in a subsequent section; in this section we use an
imperfect but comprehensive  measure of public investment  including state enterprises.
6These data come from an amalgamation  of 2 diverse sources: (1) the IFC series on public
and private investment through 1997; (2) the series on public investment in Easterly
[1999]. The latter in turn was an amalgamation of data in Bruno and Easterly [1998] and
Easterly and Rebelo [1993]. All of these sources use World Bank and IMF reports, and
for a few countries, the United Nations National Accounts. Our data thus have rather
complicated bloodlines; they are more like a mutt rather than a pedigreed dog. We use
the data subject to some reservations about their comparability across countries, but these
data are the best we have for aggregate data on public investment. After constructing a
public investment/GDP series, we subtract it from national accounts' total
investment/GDP  to get private investment/GDP.
Figure 1 provides a first look at public investment/GDP  and growth in Africa. The
picture is not encouraging for the idea that public investment has a high payoff for
growth. Most of the data is concentrated in a ball with no discernible association
between growth and public investment. Then there are the outliers: Botswana and
Equatorial Guinea had exceptional growth but middling public investment; Zambia,
Comoros, Mozambique and Sao Tome had high public investment but mediocre growth.
The only country with high public investment and exceptional growth is Lesotho.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding  picture for private investment/GDP and GDP
growth. The figure seems to show somewhat more of an association between private
investment and growth, although there are outliers like Congo and Gabon. The datapoint
of Botswana looks like it will be influential in calculating  the statistical association
between private investment and growth; we will now confirm this suspicion.
2 This section draws on Dollar and Easterly [1998].
7The table below shows a cross-section regression for 1970-97 for 29 African
countries. Private investment has a significant  positive and strong effect on growth, even
after controlling  for its endogeneity. In contrast, public investment has no discernible
effect on growth.
Dependent  Variable:  GROWTH  Per  Capita
Method:  Two-Stage  Least  Squares
Included  observations:  29
Excluded  observations:  17  after  adjusting  endpoints
Instrument  list:  C PRVINV70  PUBINV  POPGROW  RGDPCH70
Variable  Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
CONSTANT  TERM  0.000692  0.020264  0.034135  0.9731
PRIVATE  0.375311  0.113537  3.305626  0.0030
INVESTMENT/GDP
PUBLIC  -0.025896  0.125628  -0.206132  0.8384
INVESTMENT/GDP
POPULATION  -0.943977  0.655257  -1.440622  0.1626
GROWTH
INITIAL  INCOME  -9.62E-06  5.15E-06  -1.867287  0.0741
1970
R-squared  0.503848  Mean  dependent  var  0.004151
Adjusted  R-squared  0.421156  S.D.  dependent  var  0.020571
S.E.  of regression  0.015651  Sum  squared  resid  0.005879
F-statistic  5.558181
Prob(F-statistic)  0.002593
Unfortunately,  the result on the favorable impact of private investment  on
growth depends heavily on Botswana. Here is the regression omitting Botswana:
8Dependent  Variable:  GROWTH  Per  Capita
Method:  Two-Stage  Least  Squares
Included  observations:  28
Instrument  list:  C PRVINV70  PUBINV  POPGROW  RGDPCH70
Variable  Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
C  0.013025  0.015691  0.830119  0.4150
PRIVATE  0.160243  0.099032  1.618103  0.1193
INVESTMENT/GDP
PUBLIC  0.071218  0.096820  0.735571  0.4694
INVESTMENT/GDP
POPULATION  -1.186179  0.500166  -2.371571  0.0265
GROWTH
INITIAL  INCOME  -2.71  E-06  4.21  E-06  -0.644616  0.5256
1970
R-squared  0.552047  Mean  dependent  var  0.001753
Adjusted  R-squared  0.474142  S.D.  dependent  var  0.016308
S.E.  of regression  0.011826  Sum  squared  resid  0.003216
F-statistic  4.241627
Prob(F-statistic)  0.010230
The coefficient on private investment  is only a third as large and not even
significant at the 10 percent level. The variable that most explains relative growth
performance now is population growth.
Does the lack of payoff in investment reflect low human capital in Africa? We
tried adding the Barro-Lee years of schooling to the above regression, both as an
independent term and as an interaction term with private investment. Schooling was
insignificant, confirming results by Pritchett [1996] that the educational expansion in
Africa has so far not yielded a high payoff. If the underlying relationship between growth
and investment is a non-linear one, then it is not surprising that a linear regression yields
no significant coefficients. Furthermore,  if public and private capital were complements
in the aggregate production function, the relationship  between growth and investment
9would be nonlinear. However, Devarajan, Swaroop  and Zou [1997], among others, have
estimated similar non-linear relationships and found public investment to be "too high."
B. Growth accounting
Although the linear investment-growth  model is popular in both cross-country
regressions and individual country forecasting, it does not have good theoretical
foundations.  The Harrod-Domar model on which the linear growth model was based is no
longer widely accepted because of its unappealing  premises of surplus labor and zero
substitutability  between capital and labor. Some new growth models suggest linearity of
growth to a broad concept of capital investment that includes physical capital, human
capital, and technological knowledge;  these models would not predict a linear
relationship between growth and physical capital investment alone. 3 A Solow production
function approach would relate growth of output per worker to growth of capital per
worker. We consider this approach here.
Figure 3a shows the African observations  of capital growth per worker and output
growth per worker of Nehru and Dhareshwar [1993]. There is no statistically significant
association between capital growth per worker and output growth per worker. The
coefficient on capital growth per worker, which is conceptually the share of capital in
output, is .21 and is significant only at the 15 percent level. The figure shows such
notable outliers as Nigeria and Sudan, which had capital growth per worker of over 4
percent per annum, but had zero or negative growth of output per worker. Outliers in the
other direction include Kenya and Mauritius, which had capital growth per worker of
3 One exception is the original Romer [19871  model of endogenous growth, which suggested externalities
to physical capital investment such that there was a linear relationship between output and physical capital.
This model does not have many adherents today, and Romer [1994]  himself disavowed it in favor of a
10zero (i.e. the capital stock growing at same rate as labor force), but had labor productivity
growth of 2 percent per annum.
The picture is even worse if we consider data for a more recent period 1977-94,
using data from Bruno and Easterly [1998].4 Although 10 of the 19 countries with data
had positive growth of capital per worker, only 3 had positive per capita output growth
(Figure 3b). The correlation between output growth and capital growth is once again
insignificant. The R-squared is only .10, indicating that capital growth per worker
explains only 10 percent of the variation in growth of output per capita within Africa.
C. Policies and Growth
Lest the reader think that the Africa sample is too small and too noisy to yield
significant results on anything, we consider  here a regression of per capita growth rates
on policies. The following  parsimonious specification works well for the Africa sample:
Dependent  Variable:  GROWTH  Per  Capita
Method:  Least  Squares
Africa  Sample  only,  4 year  averages,  1970-92
Included  observations:  94
White  Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors  & Covariance
Variable  Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
C  0.012106  0.004455  2.717516  0.0079
Black  Market  Premium  -0.004747  0.002381  -1.993464  0.0492
Pub.  Sec Balance/GDP  0.002702  0.000602  4.487297  0.0000
R-squared  0.178598  Mean  dependent  var  -0.005259
Adjusted  R-squared  0.160546  S.D.  dependent  var  0.032664
S.E.  of regression  0.029928  Akaike  info  criterion  -4.148670
Sum  squared  resid  0.081506  Schwarz  criterion  -4.067501
Log  likelihood  197.9875  F-statistic  9.893117
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000130
model of endogenous  technical change. See Easterly [1999] for a description of the downfall of the Harrod-
Domar model.
4They  used updated data through 1993  for capital stocks from Nehru and Dhareshwar and World Bank
data through 1994 for output per capita.
11In a pooled regression of four-year average per capita growth rates 1970-92  for
African countries, the black market premium and the public sector balance/GDP are both
significant  with the expected sign. (The investment share is still insignificant when added
to this regression.) The black market premium and the public sector balance have been at
the center of the policy debate in Africa. The poor incentives created by foreign exchange
market distortions and high budget deficits could help explain why investment has not
been productive in Africa. These adverse policies may have more fundamental
determinants,  like the ethnic polarization discussed by Easterly and Levine (1997).
D. Country examples
Regressions like those done above suppose a linear relationship between
investment and growth. Another way of showing the weakness of such a relationship in
Africa is by examining the variation within countries over time. Did countries that
appeared to have a linear relationship of investment with growth maintain that
relationship  over time?
Figure 4 shows the example of Kenya. We choose the coefficient on investment
so that it fits the initial period, and then we extrapolate this relationship for the rest of the
period. We see that the investment-growth  relationship that held in the 70s did not
extrapolate well into the 1980s and 1990s. Per capita income should have kept growing
at a rapid clip after 1980; instead it stagnated.
An analogous country exercise for growth accounting would be to assume a
"normal" productivity growth of say, 1 percent per annum, and add it to .4 (capital share)
* capital growth per worker to predict output growth per worker. Figure 5 shows the
results of such an enterprise for Nigeria. Given its rapid capital growth per worker and a
12normal TFP growth of 1 percent, Nigerian output worker should have more than doubled
over 1960-88. Instead it hardly increased at all. Capital growth was not productive in
Nigeria over this period.
D. Indirect evidence  from aid and investment
Another way to assess whether returns to capital were high or not is to calculate
the response of investment to foreign aid. Under prevailing assumptions in the foreign aid
business, capital in poor countries has good returns but investment remains too low
because of liquidity constraints and low domestic saving. The answer is thought to be
foreign aid, which relieves the liquidity constraint and supplements  domestic saving.
Does aid pass into investment in practice in Africa? The table below gives the answer
from regressing investment/GDP  on overseas development assistance/GDP country by
country for the period 1960-95.
Results of regressing Gross Domestic  Investment/GDP  on ODA/GDP
country  by  country  in Africa,  1965-95
Coefficient of Investment on  Number of  Percent of Sample
ODA  countries
Total  34  100%
Positive, significant, and >=1  0  0%
Positive and significant  8  24%
Positive  17  50%
Negative  17  50%
Negative and significant  12  35%
13No country in Africa had a one for one pass-through of aid into investment, as
would have been expected from the liquidity constraint idea. Eight out of 34 African
countries had a significant and positive relationship between aid and investment; more
(12) had a negative and significant  relationship. There is no evidence from the aid-
investment relationship  of high returns to investment frustrated by lack of liquidity. 5
To give another country example, Figure 6 shows how high investment would
have been in Madagascar if aid had passed into investment  one for one since 1960.
Investment would have reached 18 percent of GDP; instead actual investment to GDP
hovered around 2 percent.
We have documented here two failures of conventional analysis: the failure of the
linear growth-investment  relationship  and the failure of the one for one aid-investment
relationship. What if we combine these two models to create a counterfactual  for a given
country? Easterly 1999 does such a calculation  for Zambia. If all aid had gone into
investment and investment had yielded an average payoff for growth (ICOR of 3.5), then
Zambia's per capita income by 1995 would have reached $20,320; instead it declined to
around $600. The counterfactual  of an income 34 times higher than actual shows how
badly the linear investment-growth  and aid-investment models failed in Africa.
E. Composition  of public investment
The finding that public investment  is unproductive in Africa, which seems to be
robust to various specifications  and data sets, could be troubling to those who decried the
cutbacks in government investment  brought on by adjustment programs. Had these
5 This finding is in line with that of Boone [1994, 19961,  who finds a zero coefficient  across countries
between aid (suitably instrumented)  and investment.
14cutbacks been avoided, and public investment increased, our results show that Africa's
growth would not have been any higher. A possible response would be that it is the
composition, and not the level, of public investment that is important. Had African
governments invested in health, education and infrastructure,  for instance, the effects on
per capita GDP growth would have been favorable. To test this hypothesis, we need to
use data from the IMF's Government Finance Statistics, which is the only internationally-
comparable database on the components  of public expenditure. The total public
investment figure would not be consistent with that used in the previous regressions in
this section. Nevertheless, the data from the GFS give qualitatively the same result for a
regression of per capita GDP growth on private and public investment. When public
expenditure more generally is broken down into its components, none of the individual
expenditure items has a statistically  significant association with growth. Furthermore, the
coefficient on private investment is generally not statistically  significant when controlling
for these different components of public expenditure. In other words, given the levels of
public spending in health, education, and infrastructure,  additional private investment
would not have benefited African growth. Finally, in assessing the determinants of
private investment in Africa, we find that public investment  has a negative coefficient--
strengthening the possibility that there was more crowding out than crowding in.
F. Implications
The direct and indirect evidence of overall poor returns to investment in Africa in
the cross-country data contradict the notion that investment was too low in Africa.
Higher investment would not have had a high payoff. The much-denigrated capital flight
out of Africa may well have been a rational response to low returns at home. Collier et al
15[1999]  find 39% of African private wealth is held abroad. Indeed Africans are probably
better off having made external investments than they would have been if they had
invested solely at home!
III. Evidence  from Tanzanian  manufacturing  on the productivity of capital
The tenuous relationship between investment and growth can be illustrated with
evidence  from the evolution of Tanzania's manufacturing  sector. Focusing on the
manufacturing  sector of one country provides useful insights. Manufacturing technology
is closer to being universally available than in other sectors: equipment and the
knowledge to utilize it are purchasable on the world market unlike that in many of the
non-traded sectors. Thus, differences in national production functions which may affect
cross country results are less severe in manufacturing.  It is likely that both output and
inputs are measured more accurately than in other sectors, at least in formal
manufacturing. Sectoral shifts that may affect aggregate productivity are less than those
resulting from movements from subsistence  agriculture to the modern sector. Finally,
unlike other sectors such as agriculture and construction, the sector is relatively immune
to natural forces such as drought or excessive rain that continue for several years and
affect output.
Prins and Szirmai [1998] in collaboration with Tanzanian statistical agencies have
recalculated the Tanzanian national accounts figures. Although the revised absolute
numbers for value added differ from the official ones, both the levels and the
intertemporal  profile are similar. Value added and value added per worker, VA/N, in
manufacturing  rose from Independence 1964 to 1975, then began a sustained decline,
VAIN, falling 38% between 1975 and 1990.
16A. Sources of the Decline in Labor Productivity
VA/N in Tanzania fell between 1975 and 1990 for the entire manufacturing sector
and its component branches (Table 1). There are several potential sources of the decline
that are depicted in Figure 7.
1. A decrease in the capital-labor  ratio along the 1975 production function -the
move from A to B. This move could result from several causes: (a) a decline in the wage-
rental ratio, w/P, leading firms to reduce their capital- labor ratios, implying a decline in
VA/N unless TFP increased; (b) the hiring of unnecessary  labor, particularly in public
enterprises acting as employers of last resort; (c) a reduction in the flow of capital
services (from the diminished capital stock) as capacity utilization declines due either to
fall in demand or to the unavailability of complementary  inputs, the latter due to foreign
exchange constraints in the aggregate economy that forces firms to decrease production
even where there is a potential for profitable sales. Ndulu 1986 also considers the
possibility that output growth has not matched capacity growth due to a decline in
utilization rates.
2.  A decline in TFP, a movement from A, the position in 1975, to C or D in 1990,
implying technological forgetting or an increase in the weight of low productivity sectors
or firms, particularly public enterprises.
B. Changes in Capital  per Worker  and Incentives to alter the capital-labor ratio
Tanzania experienced  a significant decline in the wage rental ratio, w/PK during
the last quarter century. The user cost of capital rose as the cost of imported equipment
increased due to devaluations and local building costs went up as well. For most firms
and industries, the optimal capital-labor  ratio should have fallen, as depicted in Figure 8,
17causing a decrease in labor productivity  unless this was offset by a rise in TFP. The
decline in VA/N shown in Table 1 is the expected outcome of factor price movements.
Surprisingly,  Tanzanian data imply that the capital-labor  ratio for the entire sector grew,
considerably  in some periods, despite the decline in the wage-rental ratio. Such
movements could be due to a shift in the composition of output towards sectors with
greater capital-labor  ratios but sector specific capital-labor  ratios are not available to
allow a test of this.
Table 2 shows the nominal wage in Tanzanian manufacturing along with the
major components of the user cost of capital, the price indices for non-residential
structure and equipment. The expression for the user cost of capital, ignoring any capital
gains, is
PK = CK [(i-p*) + d)]  (1)
where PK is the user cost of capital, CK is the price of new capital goods, i the
nominal rate of interest, p* the growth rate of the general price index, and d the
depreciation rate. A major component of PK is the cost of capital goods which rose very
rapidly. The appropriate value of (i-p*) is difficult to determine empirically. Although p*
is available, the correct value of the nominal interest rate that firms could earn is not
clear. We assume that firms have the alternative of lending in the grey market at a fixed
premium above the rate of inflation and therefore this remains constant. Unless the "true"
value declined very rapidly, w/PK would still have declined.
For three of the five year sub-periods, the wage-rental  ratio was unambiguously
decreasing, the price deflator for both investment components increasing more rapidly
than wages. Only in 1980 to 1985 would the movement  in w/PK depend on the particular
18function used to aggregate the investment components.  This indicates that optimal
capital/labor ratios should have been declining which would imply a decrease in VA/N
unless there was an offsetting growth in TFP. Yet as we will show in the next section,
available data indicate that the capital-labor  ratio was increasing through most of the
period for the entire sector.
Van Engelen [1996, p. 55] presents the annual investment/VA ratio in Tanzanian
manufacturing  for the period 1966 to 1994. We have calculated averages for consecutive
five year periods, shown in Table 3. The values in several periods are quite startling, e.g.,
in 1986-90  investment exceeded value added originating in manufacturing and in 1977-
1979 the ratio was close to unity. The IVA rates can be converted into gross capital stock
growth rates by noting that K* = (I/VA)/(KNVA)  = i/O  where 0 is the marginal capital-
output ratio. Subtracting the depreciation  rate, d, yields the growth rate of net capital
stock, Kn* = K* -d. This exercise is carried out in Table 3 using two values for 0 and d.6
Even making the assumptions least favorable to finding a substantial value of K, 0
- 6 and d = .05, the growth rate of the capital stock was positive over the last 20 years
(column 7).  For 0 = 3 and d = .05, the capital stock growth rate would have exceeded 17
percent over the last two decades (column 4), much greater than that of the growth of the
labor force shown in column 3. For the period 1976 to 1990, Tanzanian manufacturing's
capital-labor  ratio grew substantially  for all sets of assumptions yet the constant price
6 We are not using the measured values  of 0 which are themselves endogenous and reflect inefficiency in
the use of capital. Rather, the values  used, 3 and 6, reflect the boundaries of experience in relatively
efficient economies over time. Insofar as 0 is greater and the actual growth of the capital stock is lower than
that recorded, the low growth of K  is not due to the lack of investment but to inefficiency. Note that if cost
mninimizing  behavior prevailed, the optimal output capital ratio, (VA/K) =  [(a/l-a)(w/PK)a'1  using the
Cobb-Douglas.  With w/PK  declining, B  = K/Q as well as KIL should have declined and the value of K  for a
given investment rate should have increased.
19value added per worker declined by about 40 percent! 7 To take one period when value
added per worker was decreasing, 1976-90,  any set of assumptions about 0 and d still
yields a considerable increase in the capital-labor  ratio. This suggests that capital-
shallowing  is not a plausible explanation of the observed decline in labor productivity  in
Tanzania. Indeed, in two periods of falling VA/N, 1976-80 and 1981-85,  the lowest
implied growth rates of the capital-labor ratio are .034 and .112. Perhaps  just as
surprising is the continuing growth in the absolute size of the labor force over the years
despite stagnation or decline in constant price value added. Both phenomena together
imply that firms were not minimizing costs, a result not surprising in an environment  in
which large numbers of government  interventions assured that inefficient firms survived.
Using the least favorable assumptions,  0 = 6 and d = .05, the average growth rate
of k was about 8 percent per annum between 1976 and 1990. With a = .4, this implies
that v should have increased by 3.2 percent per year rather than decline by that amount.
Using the relation v* = A* + ak*, the value of A* over the period is - 6.4. Tanzania thus
provides an interesting  case in which to look for the sources of declining labor
productivity  quite apart from low investment. The absence of competitive pressures in
product markets and policies to encourage firms to maintain employment for political
purposes can perhaps explain low levels of both VA/N and TFP. But the continuing
decline of the latter over a very long period of time remains a major puzzle.
C. Explanations of the Decline in Productivity
A number of hypotheses about the factors that could explain the combination of a
rapidly growing capital-labor ratio and declining labor productivity have been
7 See Table 3.
20considered. Several were noted above in motivating Figure 8. Two sets of causes can be
cited that reduce labor productivity,  broadly reallocative and efficiency reducing. Among
the former, the reallocation of labor from high to lower (labor) productivity sectors within
manufacturing  is a plausible candidate. However, calculations of the change in
productivity  due to reallocation of labor among manufacturing branches with differing
VA/N turns up a miniscule effect in explaining the large decline VA/N between 1975 and
1990. Similarly, estimates of the productivity losses from the expansion of Tanzania's
state owned manufacturing enterprises suggests this was not a source of the decline in
manufacturing wide VAIN. Indeed, it is not clear that the SOE sector has lower TFP
levels than the private sector, perhaps as a result of its favored access to imported inputs
and the resultant higher rates of capacity utilization.
A change in the rate of capacity utilization is one candidate. It is known that
throughout much of sub-Saharan  Africa factories operate one shift at most and there is a
perception that the rate of utilization  has gone down due to a shortage of imported inputs
upon which local industry depends. The evidence available in Tanzania suggests a
decline of about 3.2 percent a year between 1976 and 1990.  If the underlying production
function were Cobb-Douglas with a = .4, about 1.3 % of the annual decline of 3.5 could
be explained.
The full set of determinants of the decline in Tanzanian labor productivity cannot
be found. In countries that experience a growth in income, there is usually a positive
residual, TFP growth, that is left unexplained. The reverse also appears true in the case of
decline. Such a tautological  result is unsatisfying though there are clues, particularly the
abandonment of some major enterprises which may go some way in explaining the result.
21To return to our broad theme, however, it is clear that the relation between growth of per
capita income and investment may be tenuous in the one sector in which we would
expect the most stable relation, as it is unaffected by phenomena such as variable
weather. As much of the investment  in Tanzanian manufacturing  is undertaken by private
firms, the socialist orientation of the Nyerere period cannot be blamed directly though
the policies that may have discouraged effective use of capital may well have played a
role.
Until the sources of declining productivity are better understood, advocacy of
more investment  as a source of growth is premature. Improving utilization rates, for
example, offers a much less expensive and more certain path to sustained growth in
production.
IV. Conclusions
Our goal in this paper was to investigate  the relationship  between Africa's weak
growth performance and low investment rates. The cross-country evidence suggests that
there is no direct relationship.  The positive and significant coefficient on private
investment appears to be driven by the presence of Botswana in the sample. Allowing for
the endogeneity  of private investment,  controlling for policy, and positing a nonlinear
relationship  makes no difference to the conclusion. Higher investment in Africa would
not by itself produce faster GDP growth. Africa's low investment and growth rates
therefore, seem to be symptoms of underlying factors.
To investigate these factors, and to correct for some of the problems with cross-
country analysis, we undertook a case study of manufacturing investment in Tanzania.
We attempted to identify the reasons why output per worker declined while capital per
22worker increased. Some of the usual suspects, such as shifts from high to low
productivity subsectors, the presence of state-owned enterprises, or poor policies, did not
play a significant role in this decline. Rather, low capacity utilization (possibly the by-
product of poor policies) and absorptive capacity constraints in skill-acquisition seem to
be critical factors. If Tanzania is not atypical of Africa, the low productivity of
investment  was not due to any single factor, but to a combination of factors, all of which
occurred simulataneously.
What are the implications of these results? First, we should be more careful about
calling for an investment boom to resume growth in Africa. Unless some or all of the
underlying factors that made investment unproductive in the past are addressed, the
results may be disappointing. We should also be more circumspect about Africa's low
savings rate. Perhaps the low savings rate was due to the fact that the returns to
investment were so low. Also, the relatively high level of capital flight from Africa may
have been a rational response to the lack of investment opportunities at home.
Secondly, our results suggest that there is no single key to unlocking investment
and GDP growth in Africa. Just as a combination of factors contributed to investment's
low productivity in the past, the solution  lies in addressing this set of factors
simultaneously.
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26Table 1
Percentage Decline in Constant Price Value Added per Worker in
Tanzanian Manufacturing Sectors, 1975-90
Sector  Percentage
Change
Food, Beverages and Tobacco  -62
Textiles and Leather  -24
Wood Products,  -67
Furniture, Paper Products,
Printing, Publishing
Chemicals, Petroleum,  -22
Rubber, Plastic Products
Non-Metallic Minerals  -05
Basic Metal Products,  -22
Machinery & Equipment,
Other Mfg.
All Manufacturing  -39
Source: I.M. Prins and A. Szirmai, 1998, Table 6.2.
27Table 2
Relative Factor Prices for Tanzanian Manufacturing
Year  Index of  Index of  Index of non-
ManufacturingWa  Equipment  residential
ges  Prices  structures
1975  100  100  100
1980  127  151  287
1985  306  220  340
1990  582  2421  1474
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Economic Survey, various issues; The World Bank, 1996.
28Table 3
Capitand  Labor Growth Rates in Tanzania
Years  Rate of  IM/GDPM  Rate of  Rate of Growth of Capital Stock:
Growth  Labor
of VA/L  Force
Growth
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
0=3  H=3  0=6  0=6
d=.05  d=.03  d=.05  d=.03
1966-70  .046  31.0  .068  .05  .07  .0  .02
1971-75  .012  29.7  .079  .05  .07  .0  .02
1976-80  -.071  79.9  .066  .22  .24  .08  .10
1981-85  -.008  65.0  -.032  .17  .19  .06  .08
1986-90  .010  106.8  .027  .31  .33  .13  .15
1991-94  NA  99.3  NA  .28  .30  .12  .14
Sources: Column 1, calculated from Prins and Szirmai, cited above; Column 2, calculated from
Van Engelen, 1996; Column 3, calculated from Prins and Szirmai, ibid. p. 40; Columns 4-7,
calculations of author.
29Figure 1: Public  investment/GDP  and  GDP Growth, 1970-97
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33Figure 5: Per capita income in Nigeria  if productivity  growth had been 1% as
against actual per capita income (1960  1.0)
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34Figure  6: Madagascar's  actual investment to GDP and  that predicted  by aid-
financed investment model
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Possible sources of change in labor productivity
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